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In two experiments, one hundred and sixty-two 6- to 8-year-olds were asked to reason 
counterfactually about events with different causal structures. All events involved 
overdetermined outcomes in which two different causal events led to the same outcome. In 
Experiment 1, children heard stories with either an ambiguous causal relation between events or 
causally-unrelated events. Children in the causally-unrelated version performed better than 
chance and better than those in the ambiguous condition. In Experiment 2, children heard stories 
in which antecedent events were causally-connected or causally-disconnected. Eight-year-olds 
performed above chance in both conditions, whereas 6-year-olds performed above chance only 
in the connected condition. This work provides the first evidence that children can reason 













CHILDREN’S COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING 
 
 3 
Children’s counterfactual reasoning about causally overdetermined events 
The ability to think counterfactually is an important cognitive achievement. When 
thinking counterfactually, one considers how events, from the mundane to the life-changing, 
could have turned out differently (e.g., “I wouldn’t have spilled my juice if I hadn’t been 
running.”, “My children never would have been born if I hadn’t met my partner.”). It allows one 
to explain events in the past and make plans to adapt one’s behaviour in the future (Byrne, 2015; 
Epstude & Roese, 2008). To generate counterfactual inferences, reasoners take their 
representation of reality and make manipulations to it, setting forth a counterfactual premise and 
following its causal implications. In the present experiments, we investigated the different causal 
event structures children can manipulate counterfactually, and highlight the importance of 
correctly characterizing the starting point of this process – the representations of reality off 
which counterfactual inferences are based – in order to arrive at a response that is deemed correct 
by adults. We argue that children’s apparent failures of counterfactual reasoning in previous 
work may instead have been due to mischaracterizations of their representations of reality.  
 As may be clear to the reader, the abilities to think causally and think counterfactually are 
closely intertwined. Reasoning about counterfactual scenarios often depends on importing 
relevant background knowledge about causes in order to draw correct counterfactual inferences 
(Sobel, 2011). Other researchers argue that drawing causal inferences may depend on reasoning 
about counterfactuals. On one view, arriving at a causal inference implies first reasoning 
counterfactually about what might have occurred but did not by comparing an observed sequence 
of events to an imagined sequence in which an event happened differently (e.g., Harris, German, 
& Mills, 1996; Lewis, 1973; Mackie, 1974). Other theories of the relation between causal and 
counterfactual reasoning assert that, when an individual makes a causal inference (e.g., X causes 
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Y), they commit to the idea of counterfactual dependency (e.g., a change to X would lead to a 
change to Y) (e.g., Gopnik & Schulz, 2007; Pearl, 2000; Schulz, Gopnik, & Glymour, 2007; 
Woodward, 2003). On this view, an individual who has inferred a particular causal model should 
be able to make correct counterfactual predictions about interventions to variables in the model.  
 From a young age, children show an impressive ability to reason causally about events 
that did not happen but could have happened. For example, after being presented with a story 
about a character who left her muddy shoes on and made the kitchen floor all dirty, 3.5-year-olds 
were able to correctly answer that if she had removed her shoes, the floor would instead be clean 
(Harris et al., 1996). In another study, three- and four-year-olds were presented with a story in 
which a character planted a flower in her garden and called her husband to come see it, which 
allowed their dog to escape from the house and trample on the flower, making the character sad 
(German & Nichols, 2003). By age four, children were able to correctly determine that the 
character would still be happy if she had not called her husband, indicating that they represented 
the causal chain of events when reasoning from the counterfactual. However, Beck, Riggs, and 
Gorniak (2010) attempted to replicate this result but did not find evidence that 4-year-olds were 
able to reason about causal chains in counterfactuals. Several other studies have found 
competence on counterfactual reasoning tasks by children’s fourth birthdays (e.g., Beck, 
Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006, standard counterfactuals; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; 
Perner, Spreng, Steinkogler, 2004; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998; Robinson & 
Beck, 2000, Study 1). Others, especially those measuring children’s experience of counterfactual 
emotions such as relief and regret, have found later development (e.g., Beck & Crilly, 2009; 
Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; 2008; Rafetseder & Perner, 2012; Weisberg & Beck, 2010; 2012).  
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What counts as genuine, adult-like counterfactual thinking has been debated recently 
among developmental psychologists. Some researchers conceptualize counterfactual thinking 
broadly and argue that the ability to represent a premise that contradicts reality suffices as 
counterfactual thinking. This ability, which encompasses pretense, fiction, and future thinking, 
emerges early in development (Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg, & Gopnik, 2012; Weisberg & 
Gopnik, 2013). Beck and colleagues hold a more precise view of counterfactual thinking, 
contrasting real world counterfactuals and general counterfactuals (the broad category 
encompassing fiction and pretend) (Beck, 2016; Beck & Riggs, 2014). Real world 
counterfactuals carry the additional requirements of bearing a close resemblance to reality and 
being held in comparison to reality in the mind of the reasoner. Beck and colleagues argue that 
the ability to reason about real world counterfactuals develops around age 6. Rafetseder and 
colleagues provide a narrower still definition of counterfactual thinking, arguing that children do 
not display genuine counterfactual thinking until they appreciate what they call the nearest 
possible world constraint, which develops in adolescence (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 
2010; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014; Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013).   
The nearest possible world constraint involves the manipulation of one aspect of an event 
while holding all other features constant. That is, one should change only those features that are 
casually dependent on a counterfactual antecedent and maintain all other features of the real 
world (Edgington, 2011). A good test of this is to present children with semifactual or causally 
overdetermined scenarios. Two independent antecedent events lead to the same outcome and one 
is asked to consider how the outcome would be different if one of the antecedent events had not 
happened. For example, a character may get rained on and then go swimming, with both events 
leading to the outcome of “getting wet”. Rafetseder and colleagues (2010; 2013) argue that 
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children in Harris and colleagues’ (1996) study, who were presented with a character who dirties 
the floor with her muddy shoes, were passing using basic conditional reasoning, which simply 
requires children to reason using general regularities, such as “if no dirty shoes, then clean 
floor”. In this case, the reasoner can disregard all other aspects of the scenario and just reason 
based on their causal knowledge about the impact of footwear cleanliness on floors.  
To test the distinction between basic conditional and counterfactual reasoning, Rafetseder 
and colleagues (2010; 2013) presented children, adolescents, and adults with scenarios that 
required them to appreciate the nearest possible world constraint. One task required participants 
to learn a complex set of rules about a particular story. A second task presented simpler stories 
that did not require participants to learn a set of rules (Rafetseder et al, 2013, Study 2). The 
simpler stories had the following format: “Susie and her brother Max are outside playing. They 
go into the kitchen and they don’t take their shoes off. They make the floor all dirty.” 
Participants were then asked a counterfactual question: “What would have happened if Susie had 
taken off her shoes? Would the floor be clean or would it be dirty?” Here, the correct answer is 
that the floor would still be dirty even if Susie had taken her shoes off because Max would still 
have his shoes on. It also was not until children were approximately 12 years old that they 
reliably passed on either set of tasks.  
These results are quite surprising. We agree with Rafetseder and colleagues that 
appreciating the nearest possible world constraint is a valuable litmus test for sophisticated 
counterfactual thinking. However, we argue that certain features of Rafetseder and colleagues’ 
(2010; 2013) tasks may have underestimated children’s appreciation of the nearest possible 
world constraint and therefore their counterfactual reasoning abilities.   
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First, the counterfactual questions asked were somewhat misleading from a pragmatic 
standpoint. An experimenter presents a short story with two similar events (e.g., two characters 
wearing muddy shoes) and then asks a question about the removal of only one of these events 
(e.g., “What would have happened if Susie had taken off her shoes?”). This question is free of 
certain markers one may typically use to communicate unambiguously (i.e., the experimenter 
does not say “just Susie” or “only Susie”). Participants may make the incorrect inference that the 
experimenter intended to refer to both events (e.g., Max and Susie both wearing their shoes). 
Another issue is that the very process of the experimenter asking the child a counterfactual 
question about such scenarios may lead the child to assume that the experimenter has implied a 
change from the status quo. If the experimenter and child have just watched a story together that 
ends with a dirty floor and the experimenter then asks the child about a change to an antecedent, 
the child may provide a “different” response, not because they are capable only of basic 
conditional reasoning, but because they infer this is the answer the experimenter is looking for. 
A second and overlapping issue is that participants may have made incorrect inferences 
about the causal structure of the events in some of the stories presented to them. Whereas 
Rafetseder and colleagues (2013) intended for the antecedent events to be causally unrelated to 
one another, children may have represented the events differently, perhaps inferring that the 
antecedents existed in a causal chain or both had a common cause. Removing one event in a 
counterfactual scenario may have had a knock-on effect, wiping out the other. Indeed, Rafetseder 
and colleagues (2013) reported that some children described a causal connection between the 
two events in their “sleeping” story. In the above example, some children may have inferred that 
Max would have taken his shoes off because Susie took her shoes off, given that their entry into 
the kitchen could be seen as a collaborative action in the original scenario. If this were the case, 
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then “the floor would be clean” would actually be the correct answer – an answer Rafetseder and 
colleagues (2013) marked as incorrect. Thus, children who were generating inferences to 
increase coherence within the story could have been those most likely to fail the task. Children 
could have failed this task not by disobeying the nearest possible world constraint – which 
stipulates that only those features that are causally dependent on the antecedent should be 
changed – but instead by making incorrect judgments about what exactly was causally dependent 
on the antecedent. Because the causal structure children represented may have been different 
from the causal structure intended by the researchers, children’s failure on counterfactual 
questions could have stemmed not from an inability to reason counterfactually, but from 
different representations of reality off which their counterfactual inferences were based. In this 
study, we attempted to make the causal event structure in stories more transparent to ensure the 
input to children’s counterfactual reasoning was as intended.  
Rafetseder and colleagues’ (2010; 2013) findings present an apparent challenge for 
theories of causal reasoning that argue that counterfactual inferences are made either before 
(Harris et al., 1996; Lewis, 1973; Mackie, 1974) or along with causal inferences (Pearl, 2000; 
Schulz et al., 2007; Woodward, 2003). These theories suggest that children should be able to 
make counterfactual inferences that comply with their causal inferences. Consistent with this 
argument, Schulz and colleagues (2007) found that preschoolers were both able to use evidence 
from interventions to infer the correct causal structure of a simple physical system (a gear toy), 
and use their knowledge of causal structure to answer counterfactual questions about the 
outcome of hypothetical interventions to the toy. Preschoolers’ causal and counterfactual 
inferences appeared to go hand-in-hand with one another.  
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 In contrast, a set of studies with older children (5- to 7-year-olds) found an asymmetry 
between children’s causal and counterfactual judgments (Burns & McCormack, 2009; Frosch, 
McCormack, Lagnado & Burns, 2011). Children’s counterfactual judgments were not sensitive 
to differences in causal structure, and were inconsistent with their causal judgments which 
children had to infer based on temporal cues. One possible reason for this discrepancy in findings 
may have to do with the quality of children’s representations of causal structure and the way in 
which they are derived (McCormack, Frosch, & Burns, 2011). In particular, representations built 
from perceiving the temporal relation between events (as in Burns & McCormack, 2009; Frosch 
et al, 2011) may not support reasoning about counterfactual interventions. 
The existing findings underscore the importance of correctly characterizing the 
representation children are considering in their counterfactual computations. Differences in 
children’s representations of the causal structure of reality could lead to apparent failures in 
counterfactual reasoning. In the current research we examine this as a possible reason for 
children’s failure at counterfactual reasoning tasks (Rafetseder et al., 2010; 2013). In particular, 
we investigated whether adapting Rafetseder et al’s (2013, Study 2) stories would allow children 
to demonstrate counterfactual reasoning by respecting the nearest possible world at a younger 
age. In Experiment 1, we adapted versions of Rafetseder et al’s (2013) stories. In the new 
adapted versions, we attempted to make the causal structure of the events less ambiguous by 
making antecedent events causally unrelated to one another. We did this by, for example, 
separating the events temporally and by giving the protagonists different goals. In Experiment 2, 
we created 4 new sets of stories that were more tightly controlled, and compared children’s 
reasoning about stories with different causal structures – in which antecedent events were 
causally-connected or causally-disconnected. By presenting children with a clearer causal 
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structure, we expected that they would show better performance at a younger age than children in 
the previous studies, as described.  
We chose to include 6-, 7-, and 8-year-olds in the present research– an age range during 
which we expected nearest possible world understanding to develop. Children in this age range 
did not succeed on Rafetseder et al’s (2013) tasks, but we reasoned that, with the described 
modifications, children would demonstrate earlier understanding of the nearest possible world 
constraint. This age range also coincides with the age at which Beck and Riggs (2014) argue that 
adult-like counterfactual reasoning develops. In sum, we hypothesized that between the ages of 6 
and 8 years, children would demonstrate nearest possible world understanding when the causal 
structure of the events was made less ambiguous.  
Experiment 1  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited and tested at a science center in [location blinded for review] between 
January and April 2016. The final sample consisted of 98 children between the ages of 6.0 to 
8.98 years (M = 7.44, SD = 0.88, 49 girls): 34 6-year-olds (M = 6.48, SD = 0.33), 32 7-year-olds 
(M = 7.42, SD = 0.30), and 32 8-year-olds (M = 8.47, SD = 0.32). The sample size was 
determined using power analyses and to meet counterbalancing requirements. All participants 
were typically-developing, and spoke and understood English (the language in which testing 
took place) fluently, according to parental report. For inclusion, children were required to speak 
and hear English 50% or more of the time. An equal number of girls and boys were tested across 
each age group and condition. An additional 18 children were tested, but excluded because they 
did not meet language or age requirements (n = 13), answered both sets of control questions 
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incorrectly (n = 2), or experimenter errors (n = 3). Signed parental consent and children’s verbal 
assent were obtained for all participating children. Across both experiments, our sample of 
children were 54% Caucasian, 13% mixed ethnicity, 12% Chinese, 6% South Asian, 3% 
Japanese, 3% Latin American, 3% Southeast Asian, 3% West Asian, and 3% other ethnicity. The 
majority of children were from middle-class households.  
Materials and Design 
 We adapted four stories from Rafetseder and colleagues’ (2013) study, but made several 
changes to the stimuli and procedure, detailed below. As mentioned, we hypothesized that 
children in Rafetseder and colleagues’ study may have represented the events differently than 
intended by the researchers. To test this possibility, we created new versions of each of the four 
stories to make the causal structure of the events clearer to children. There were two versions of 
each story: an ambiguous version, based on Rafetseder and colleagues’ stories, in which the 
causal relation between antecedents was unclear (e.g., children could have seen the events as 
related), and an unrelated version, in which we attempted to make the antecedent events causally 
independent. For example, in the muddy floor story, Susie and Max come inside and make the 
floor all dirty with their muddy shoes. In the ambiguous condition, Susie and Max come inside 
together. In the unrelated condition, there was a temporal separation between the two children 
entering the house, and the characters were given different motivations for entering the house 
(i.e., Susie comes inside to get some juice and Max later runs inside to get a bandage). The logic 
of the other three stories was the same. Unlike Rafetseder and colleagues (2013), who used props 
and enacted the scenarios live, we chose to present the stories to children using pictures and pre-
recorded audio stimuli in order to standardize the delivery of the stories. Visual stimuli for the 
eight stories were developed using the program Bitstrips Inc. The story narration was pre-
CHILDREN’S COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING 
 
 12 
recorded by a female native English speaker not otherwise involved in the study. Transcripts and 
images from all stories are available in the Supporting Information.  
Procedure  
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of two conditions (ambiguous or 
unrelated), and heard the four stories in one of two orders: (1) muddy floor, (2) sleeping, (3) 
getting wet, and (4) painting, or in a second randomized order (2, 1, 4, and 3). Children were 
presented with four pre-recorded stories each followed by two control questions and one test 
question. The entire task took around 5 minutes. The procedure was the same for each age group 
and condition. Participants sat in front of a laptop and the session started with the experimenter 
introducing the stories by saying, “Today we’re going to listen to some stories on the computer 
and then I’ll ask you some questions about them. I want you to listen very carefully. Are you 
ready?”. The story then played from start to finish and terminated with a black screen. While the 
black screen was displayed, the experimenter asked the child a series of questions. The 
experimenter first asked two control questions. The before control question asked for the initial 
state before the two antecedent events happened (e.g., “Was the floor dirty or clean before Susie 
and Max walked in?”), and the now control question asked for the final state (e.g., “Is the floor 
dirty or clean now?”). The experimenter then asked the counterfactual test question about either 
the first or second antecedent event (e.g., “How would the story have ended if Susie had taken 
her shoes off? Would the floor still be dirty, or would it be clean?”). The order of mention of the 
adjectives of interest (e.g. dirty or clean vs clean or dirty) was counterbalanced. We changed the 
wording of the counterfactual test questions from Rafetseder and colleagues’ (2013) study 
(changes underlined) to make it clearer to the children what information the experimenter was 
requesting. First, we specified that the counterfactual requested information about a possible 
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change to the state of affairs at the end of the story. Second, we inserted the word “still” into all 
counterfactual questions to make reference to the actual outcome. 
Children were asked 3 questions after each story, in the following order: a before 
question, a now question, and a counterfactual question, as in previous studies using this design 
(Harris et al, 1996; Rafetseder et al., 2013). Note that for each story, children were asked a 
counterfactual question about either the first or second antecedent event. Each child was asked 
about the first antecedent (e.g., “…if Susie had taken her shoes off?”) for two stories and the 
second antecedent (e.g., “…if Max had taken his shoes off?”) for the other two stories. This was 
fully counterbalanced within and between participants. 
Coding 
  The children’s answers were live scored during testing. Sessions were also video-
recorded for reliability purposes. A second coder, unaware of the goal of the study, coded 30 out 
of the 98 included participants (31%). The coders had a high level of agreement (98%), κ = 0.96, 
p < .001.  
Results and Discussion 
Control questions 
 Children were very accurate on the control questions about the state of affairs at the 
beginning and ending of the stories (i.e., the before and now questions). Overall, children were 
96% accurate on before questions and 95% accurate on now questions. Children’s responses to 
before questions were more accurate in the unrelated condition (98% correct) than in the 
ambiguous condition (93% correct), Mann-Whitney U = 1053.50, p = .047. Children’s responses 
to now questions did not differ significantly across conditions, p = .648. As mentioned, children 
who answered both the before and now questions incorrectly were excluded from analyses (n = 
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2). Excluding those children who answered any control questions wrong from the analyses did 
not change the pattern of results, and therefore these children’s data were retained in the analyses 
reported below.    
Counterfactual questions 
Children received a score out of 4 based on their answers to the counterfactual questions 
across all 4 stories. Children’s scores did not differ according to story order, p = .624. We used 
ordinal regression to investigate the effect of the two predictor variables, condition and age, on 
the overall score out of 4. Ordinal regression is a method for modelling ordinal outcome 
measures, and yields odds ratio statistics that indicate the magnitude of the odds of a higher score 
given a change in the value of a predictor variable. Odds ratios provide an index of effect size. A 
model including condition (unrelated or ambiguous) as a categorical predictor, age (centred by 
subtracting the mean) as a continuous predictor variable, and the condition by age interaction 
was significant, χ2(3) = 12.29, p = .006. Children in the unrelated condition had 2.74 times 
higher odds of receiving a higher score than those in the ambiguous condition, Wald χ2(1) = 
7.39, p = .007, parameter estimate = 1.009, 95% CI = [0.28, 1.74]. Age did not emerge as a 
significant predictor, p = .843. The condition by age interaction was not significant, but 
suggested a marginal effect of age on condition, odds ratio = 1.89, Wald χ2(1) = 2.29, p = .130, 
parameter estimate = 0.64, 95% CI = [0.06, 1.33].  
We also analyzed children’s performance in each condition against chance [with chance 
=2]. Children in the unrelated condition answered significantly more questions correctly than 
expected by chance, Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: z = -2.58, p = .010. Children in the 
ambiguous condition did not answer more questions correctly than expected by chance, z = -
1.36, p = .173.  
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Questions about the first versus second antecedent 
The total score out of 4 comprised questions about the removal of the first antecedent 
event for 2 stories, and the second antecedent for the other 2 stories. Overall, a larger percentage 
of children answered both questions about the second antecedent (Q2: 40.8%) correctly than the 
first antecedent (Q1: 28.6%). This was also the case when looking within each condition. 
Ambiguous Q1: 18.4% vs. Q2: 28.6%; Unrelated Q1: 38.8% vs. Q2: 53.1%. To analyze whether 
this difference was statistically significant, we ran a generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
model with condition as a between-subjects predictor, question type (Q1 or Q2) as a within-
subjects variable, and age (centred) as a covariate, with score (out of 2) as the dependent 
variable. This model had a multinomial distribution and a cumulative logit link function. All 
variables were entered simultaneously in the model. We did not find evidence for a statistically 
significant effect of question type on score, (B = -0.38, SE = 0.29, Wald χ2(1) = 1.77, p = .183, 
odds ratio = 0.68, 95% CI = [0.39, 1.20]). Consistent with the results of the ordinal regression 
presented above, condition was a significant predictor (B = 1.12, SE = 0.39, Wald χ2(1) = 8.36, p 
= .004, odds ratio = 3.07, 95% CI = [1.44, 6.58]), whereas age was not, odds ratio = 1.35, p = 
.097. The condition by question type interaction was not significant, p = .687. Figure 1 displays 
the percentage of children receiving scores of 0, 1, and 2 on each question type in each condition.  
 In sum, children in this study performed well when presented with stories in which the 
two antecedent causes were separated from one another. Recall that children in Rafetseder et al’s 
(2013) study did not answer counterfactual questions correctly until age 12. We adapted 
Rafetseder et al’s stories in order to elucidate the causal structure of the events. Children 
performed significantly better in this new causally unrelated condition both compared to chance 
and to the ambiguous stories modeled closely after Rafetseder et al’s (2013) vignettes. Children 
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in our study were able to obey the nearest possible world constraint substantially earlier than 
children in Rafetseder et al’s (2013) study. We suggest that children’s weaker performance in 
this previous study was due in part to features of the tasks used, rather than limitations in 
children’s counterfactual reasoning.  
In the attempt to make the antecedent events causally unrelated in the current study, 
while maintaining the main features of Rafetseder and colleagues’ (2013) examples for 
comparison purposes, it was necessary to add additional context (e.g., giving Susie and Max 
different goals for entering the kitchen). A concern therefore is that the better performance in this 
condition may have been due to the additional context, rather than removing the possibility of a 
causal relation between antecedents. Another concern is that some of the stories in the unrelated 
condition left open the possibility that antecedent events were still related to one another, and 
therefore the causal structure of these stories may not have been as clear as intended. For 
example, in the muddy floor story the floor was clean when Max entered in the ambiguous 
version, but already dirty when he entered in the unrelated version. In the latter case, children 
may have inferred that he would remove or keep his shoes on depending on the state of the floor 
when he entered the room. Although we had Max rush in to the kitchen in the unrelated version, 
children may still have represented a different causal structure than intended.  
The fact that children performed slightly better when asked about the removal of the 
second antecedent than the first in both conditions suggests that they may have been drawing 
causal inferences even in the unrelated condition. An alternate explanation for these findings is 
that children may have found it easier to access or construct a representation of the state of 
affairs in the absence of the second event. By virtue of the temporal sequence, children saw the 
scene after the first antecedent event occurred but before the second had occurred, and therefore 
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may have found it easier to answer the question about the removal of the second antecedent. This 
may particularly have been the case in the unrelated condition, in which the two antecedent 
events had more of a temporal separation between them than in the ambiguous condition.  
In Experiment 2 we created four new sets of stories that were more tightly controlled and 
which had a clearer causal structure.  
Experiment 2 
 We created new stories to equate the two versions of each story and to test the 
generalizability of the findings from Experiment 1. The stories followed the same structure as 
those in Experiment 1, with two antecedent events leading to the same outcome. However, in one 
order the same two antecedent events were causally-connected to one another and in the reversed 
order were causally-disconnected. We included a continuous age range in Experiment 1 (from 
6.0 to 8.98 years), but decided to include only 6- and 8-year-olds in the present experiment and 
treated age as a categorical variable, because children’s performance did not appear to change 
drastically between the ages of 6 and 7 in Experiment 1. We hypothesized that by age 8, children 
would be able to negotiate these different causal structures in their counterfactual representations 
and would perform above chance in both conditions. We included questions about the removal of 
both the first and second antecedent in this experiment, but were not necessarily expecting a 
difference in performance across question types. If children were correctly representing the 
causal structure, one would not expect to see a difference across question types.  
Method 
Participants 
The final sample consisted of 64 children in two age groups including 32 6-year-olds (M 
= 6.70, SD = 0.25) and 32 8-year-olds (M = 8.50, SD = 0.31). Language requirements were the 
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same as in Experiment 1, and an equal number of girls and boys were tested across age groups 
and conditions. Three additional children were tested and had to be excluded because of failing 
the control questions (n = 1), and insufficient English language exposure (n = 2). Parental 
consent and child assent was obtained for all participating children. Children were tested in a 
science center (n = 25) or in our university laboratory (n = 38), drawn from a large database of 
area families in [location blinded for review] between April and December 2016. Performance 
did not differ significantly between children tested in the two locations, p = .476.   
Materials 
We developed two new sets of four stories. All stories consisted of two antecedent events 
that both lead to the same outcome. In the causally-connected condition, the first antecedent was 
a cause of the second antecedent, and both led to the same outcome. In the causally-disconnected 
condition, the first and second antecedents were not causally related to one another and both led 
to the same outcome. Crucially, both versions contained the exact same antecedent events. In one 
order, they were causally-connected and in the reverse order, they were not. For example, in the 
connected version of the painting story, Heidi notices that one of the paints is in a leaky cup and 
when she tries to pick up the cup to stop it from leaking, she knocks another paint cup over. In 
the disconnected version, the two events were in reversed order, such that Heidi first accidentally 
knocks over one of her paints before noticing the other cup leaking. Each story consisted of three 
pictures designed in Bitstrips Inc. and the story narration was pre-recorded by the same speaker 
as in Experiment 1. Transcripts and images from each story are available in the Supporting 
Information.  
Design and Procedure  
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Participants were assigned to one of the two conditions (connected or disconnected) and 
heard the stories in one of two orders (1) painting, (2) flowers, (3) dress, and (4) sandcastle or the 
reversed order (4, 3, 2 and 1). Participants were asked before and now control questions, and a 
counterfactual test question (e.g., “How would the story have ended if Heidi hadn’t knocked 
over the cup of paint (the paint cup hadn’t been leaking)?”), as in Experiment 1. Again, 
participants were asked questions about the first antecedent for two stories and the second 
antecedent for the other two stories. The correct answer was the same for the first and second 
antecedent question in the disconnected condition and the second antecedent question in the 
connected condition. In these cases, the correct answer was always that the outcome would still 
be the same (e.g., the table would still be covered in paint) because one of the two antecedents 
would have still occurred. The correct answer was different, however, when asked about the 
removal of the first antecedent in the connected condition. In this case, the outcome would be 
different (e.g., the table would be clean), because the first antecedent caused the second 
antecedent. A feature of the connected condition therefore is that children could arrive at the 
correct answer half of the time by using a simpler reasoning strategy – what Rafetseder and 
colleagues (2010; 2013; Perner & Rafetseder, 2011; Rafetseder & Perner, 2014) refer to as basic 
conditional reasoning. On the question about the first antecedent in the connected condition, both 
basic conditional and mature counterfactual reasoning give the same answer. This is an issue we 
will return to in the Discussion in Experiment 2.   
Coding 
As in Experiment 1, live coding was used for all participants. A second coder, blind to the 
purpose of the study, scored the video recordings of 48 out of the 64 included participants (75%). 
Cohen’s kappa was run and reached a good level of agreement (87%), κ = 0.67, p < .001. A third 
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coder checked discrepancies (13% of trials), and in all cases they were due to poor audibility in 
the video recordings. Thus, we included the codes from the live coder in analyses.   
Results and Discussion 
Control questions 
 Children’s responses on the control questions were very accurate for both before (91%) 
questions and now questions (99%). Accuracy did not differ significantly between the two 
conditions for either before or now questions, p = .104 and .557, respectively.  
Counterfactual questions 
 As in Experiment 1, children received a score out of 4 based on their answers to the 
counterfactual questions across the 4 stories. Children who received the stories in the second 
order received marginally higher scores than those who received the stories in the first order, p = 
.104. We conducted an ordinal regression with counterfactual score as the dependent measure, 
and age (6 or 8 years) and condition (connected or disconnected) as categorical predictors, and 
the condition by age interaction term. This model was significant, χ2(3) = 20.23, p < .001. Eight-
year-olds had 17.34 times higher odds of receiving a higher score than 6-year-olds, Wald χ2(1) = 
14.76, p < .001, parameter estimate = -2.85, 95% CI = [-4.31, -1.40]. Being in the connected 
versus disconnected condition was not associated with significantly different odds of receiving a 
higher score, odds ratio = 1.08, p = .912. The age by condition interaction was significant, odds 
ratio = 7.74, χ2(1) = 4.38, p = .036, parameter estimate = 2.05, 95% CI = [0.13, 3.96]. It was only 
in the disconnected condition that 8-year-olds had higher odds of receiving a higher score than 6-
year-olds, odds ratio = 13.11, Wald χ2(1) = 11.01, p = .001, parameter estimate = -2.57, 95% CI 
= [-4.09, -1.05]. Eight-year-olds were not significantly more likely to receive a higher score than 
6-year-olds in the connected condition, odds ratio = 2.30, p = .216.  
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 We also compared children’s performance against chance using a Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test with chance equal to 2. A Bonferroni correction was applied for multiple 
comparisons, with an adjusted alpha value of .008. Overall, children in the connected condition 
answered significantly more questions correctly than expected by chance, z = -4.22, p < .001. 
Children in the disconnected condition did not answer more questions correctly than expected by 
chance, z = -1.68, p = .094. Eight-year-olds answered significantly more questions correctly than 
expected by chance in both the connected, z = -3.22, p = .001 and disconnected conditions, z = -
2.92, p = .003. Six-year-olds answered significantly more questions correctly than expected by 
chance in the connected condition, z = -2.76, p = .006, but not in the disconnected condition, p = 
.294.  
To further investigate the fact that 6-year-olds’ performance was better in the connected 
than the disconnected condition, we looked at their answers to questions about the first or second 
antecedents separately across conditions. Recall that children in the connected condition could 
have arrived at the correct answer to questions about the first antecedent via basic conditional 
reasoning. Six-year-olds answered more questions about the first antecedent correctly in the 
connected condition (Mdn = 2) than in the disconnected condition (Mdn = 1), Mann-Whitney U 
= 68.00, z = -2.47, p = .014. They answered marginally more questions correctly about the 
second antecedent in the connected condition (Mdn = 2) than in the disconnected condition (Mdn 
= 1), p = .062.  Moreover, 6-year-olds’ performance did not differ significantly across questions 
about the first versus second antecedent within either the connected, p = .713, or disconnected 
condition, p = 1.00 
Questions about the first versus second antecedent  
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In the connected condition, a similar percentage of children answered both questions 
correctly about the first (Q1: 71.9%) and second antecedent (Q2: 68.8%). Within the 
disconnected condition, a similar percentage of children also answered both questions correctly 
about the first (Q1: 46.9%) and second antecedent (Q2: 53.1%). To analyze Q1 versus Q2 scores, 
we again conducted a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model with condition and age as 
between-subjects predictors, and question type (Q1 or Q2) as a within-subjects variable, and 
score (out of 2) as the dependent variable. This model had a multinomial distribution and a 
cumulative logit link function. All variables were entered simultaneously in the model. Question 
type was not a significant predictor of score, (B = -0.68, SE = 0.77, Wald χ2(1) = 0.78, p = .376, 
odds ratio = 0.51, 95% CI = [0.11, 2.29]). Only age emerged as a significant predictor of score in 
this model, (B = -2.45, SE = 0.80, Wald χ2(1) = 9.30, p = .002, odds ratio = 0.09, 95% CI = 
[0.02, 0.42]). All other main effects and interactions were non-significant, p = .270 to 1. Figure 2 
displays the percentage of children receiving scores of 0, 1, and 2 on each question type in each 
condition. 
Eight-year-olds in this experiment made accurate counterfactual judgments both when 
faced with causally-connected and causally-disconnected antecedent events, as was the case in 
the unrelated condition in Experiment 1. Six-year-olds performed better in the connected 
condition than the disconnected condition. There are a few possible explanations for this finding. 
This better performance in the connected condition could have been partially due to the fact that 
children could succeed half of the time by using basic conditional reasoning. In support of this 
possibility, children were more accurate on questions about the first antecedent in the connected 
condition, where basic conditional and counterfactual reasoning would give the same response, 
than in the disconnected condition, in which the two would give different responses. However, 
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this cannot be the sole explanation as shown by the lack of significant differences between 
children’s responses to questions about the first versus second antecedent within the connected 
condition and their marginally better performance on questions about the second antecedent in 
the connected versus disconnected condition. 
A different explanation is that the increased causal coherence of the stories in the 
connected condition contributed to children’s success. Decades of research have demonstrated 
that children’s comprehension and memory is better for narratives with higher levels of causal 
coherence (e.g., van den Broek, Kendeou, Kremer, Lynch, Butler, White, et al., 2005; van den 
Broek, Lorch, & Thurlow, 1996). Six-year-olds may therefore benefit from scenarios that are 
easier to comprehend and recall. Future work with this age group should focus on presenting 
simpler tasks that may not place as many demands on their comprehension (e.g., inferencing) 
and memory abilities.  
The fact that 6-year-olds performed better in the connected than the disconnected 
condition lends support to the suggestion that children may seemingly fail on tasks of 
counterfactual reasoning because they make additional and unexpected causal inferences. In the 
connected condition, in which causal connections were already in place, there was little room for 
additional inferences. In the disconnected condition, although intended to present independent 
antecedent events, one could still potentially generate an explanation for how the events could be 
connected. Children could have drawn forward causal inferences or backtracking inferences, if 
they assumed that certain events were a foregone conclusion. 
General Discussion 
Mature counterfactual reasoning involves the ability to exercise the nearest possible world 
constraint. That is, the reasoner should change only those features of reality that are causally 
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dependent upon the antecedent and hold all else constant (Edgington, 2011). Prior research found 
that children did not reason according to this constraint until age 12 (Rafetseder et al., 2010; 
2013). The current results show that this ability is in place by age 8. Eight-year-olds in our study 
were able to correctly answer counterfactual questions both when antecedent events were 
causally-connected to one another and when they were disconnected. Children’s performance in 
this research indicates that they are able to contend with different causal structures in their 
counterfactual representations.  
 Why did children succeed much earlier on our version of the tasks requiring them to 
consider overdetermined scenarios than on Rafetseder and colleagues’ version (2013)? Our 
findings underscore the importance of taking task demands into account, as well as the 
possibility that children may interpret events in a way not intended by the researchers. As we 
suggested in the Introduction, children may have performed poorly in Rafetseder et al’s (2013) 
study because their representation of reality conformed to a different causal structure than 
intended by the researchers.  
  Limited previous research has found evidence for children’s sensitivity to causal 
structure when reasoning counterfactually. Using simple physical systems, Schulz and colleagues 
(2007) found that preschoolers were able to make correct counterfactual inferences that respected 
different casual structures. In contrast, Burns and colleagues (Burns & McCormack, 2009; 
Frosch et al., 2011) found that 7-year-olds’ counterfactual inferences did not respect the causal 
structure of a simple physical system, though this could have been because they had insufficient 
representations of the causal structure (McCormack et al., 2011). Although the children in our 
study succeeded at a later age than those in Schulz and colleagues’ (2007) study, together these 
findings suggest that children can reason counterfactually about events with a range of causal 
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structures if the causal structure of the events is clear to them and their representation is robust. 
Unlike Schulz and colleagues’ (2007) studies, ours used short stories involving agents, and 
focused on older children’s reasoning about causally-overdetermined outcomes, which are 
arguably more challenging and require children to exercise the nearest possible world constraint.  
We found striking preliminary evidence that children as young as 6 may be able to reason 
counterfactually about overdetermined events. Six-year-olds performed well in the connected 
condition in Experiment 2, which we suggested may have been due to increased sensitivity to the 
causal coherence of stories. We consider two additional explanations for the finding that younger 
children in the current experiments struggled under certain condition: difficulties with pragmatic 
inferences and difficulties creating separate event representations.  
Inherent to the type of task used in this research are some features that make it 
pragmatically challenging. These were not issues we could escape. We made minor changes to 
wording compared to Rafetseder and colleagues (2013), but some of the more major issues, such 
as the fact that the experimenter refers to only one of two events, are fundamental features of the 
task. One could imagine asking the child “what if Susie had taken her shoes off, but Max had 
still left them on?”, but would not be getting away from the issues that Rafetseder and colleagues 
laid out about the contrast between basic conditional and counterfactual reasoning. With minor 
pragmatic adjustments, children’s performance was at chance in the younger age group in most 
of our conditions. These younger children still could have made incorrect pragmatic inferences, 
assuming perhaps that the experimenter intended to refer to both Susie and Max even when she 
only mentioned Susie. As children get older, they may become more accustomed to the fact that 
people are not always helpful in communication and as a result may perform better on tasks of 
this type. Future work should use simpler tasks that reduce the possibility of children making 
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additional inferences. Tasks employing stories seem to be especially susceptible to these 
problems, and future work may make use of simple physical causation tasks, or tasks involving 
live agents.  
 Events that can be confused pragmatically are also likely to be those that can be conflated 
conceptually. For example, children may construct a single event representation of “wearing 
dirty shoes” because two events involving characters wearing their muddy shoes inside are 
conceptually similar to one another. Thus, another possible explanation for failure on tasks 
similar to those used in the present study is that children construct a single event representation 
for similar events. This single event is entered into the counterfactual computation and leads to 
an incorrect response. In future studies, we plan to present children with scenarios in which two 
events are conceptually very distinct (e.g., a tree gets sick because someone peels its bark and 
because it gets struck by lightning) and events that are separated temporally and spatially, to 
ensure children are creating separate event representations in tasks that require them to exercise 
the nearest possible world constraint. 
It is also worth mentioning that one study by Rafetseder and Perner (2010) found that 
children were able to engage in counterfactual reasoning by the age of 6. They gave children 
change-of-location counterfactual scenarios, in which a character was in a typical or atypical 
location when he was called to another location. For example, a doctor was either at the hospital 
(typical location) or at the park (atypical location) when he was called to the swimming pool for 
an emergency. When asked where the doctor would be if he had not been called, 6-year-olds 
demonstrated counterfactual reasoning. Importantly, this task seems to be free of many of the 
demands we have outlined above that are features of overdetermined scenarios. This task appears 
to be more pragmatically transparent, does not include easily conflated events, and does not 
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license additional causal inferences. These features may account for children’s earlier success 
compared to Rafetseder and colleagues’ other studies (2010; 2013).  
 The current findings raise the possibility that children may not respond in adult-like ways 
on counterfactual tasks not because they cannot reason counterfactually, but because they 
approach these tasks differently, perhaps imputing additional causal connections that adults 
would view as unwarranted. With age and experience, individuals may become more 
conservative about the types of causal inferences they draw. In line with this argument, Lucas, 
Bridgers, Griffiths, and Gopnik (2014) found that children were more flexible than adults in the 
inferences they drew about novel causal systems than adults. These differences in causal 
inferencing could mean that, given the same events, adults and children enter different causal 
models into their counterfactual computations, resulting in diverging counterfactual inferences.   
Conclusion 
Many previous studies of the development of counterfactual reasoning have found 
successful performance by around the age of 4 (German & Nichols, 2003, Guajardo, Parker, & 
Turley-Ames, 2009; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Harris et al., 1996; Riggs et al., 1998). 
These studies primarily required children to reason about counterfactual conditionals from 
counterfactual antecedents, without having to incorporate other aspects of reality into their 
counterfactual representation (Rafetseder & Perner, 2014), and without having to consider 
multiple possibilities simultaneously (Beck & Riggs, 2014). Studies that have required children 
to consider multiple possibilities (e.g., reality and a counterfactual possibility) have found that 
children do not succeed until age 5 or 6 (Beck et al., 2006; Beck & Guthrie, 2011; Perner et al., 
2004; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). Those that have required children to exercise the nearest 
possible world constraint have found that children do not pass until as late as adolescence 
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(Rafetseder et al., 2010; 2013). However, the current findings demonstrate that given scenarios 
with clearer causal structures, children show success using the nearest possible world constraint 
between the ages of 6 and 8.  
The current results suggest that important developments in children’s counterfactual 
reasoning take place between the age of 3½, when children passed Harris and colleagues’ (1996) 
counterfactual conditionals task, and 8, when children showed robust performance on our tasks. 
Further developments may also take place between the ages of 8, when children succeed on our 
task, and 12, when children succeeded on Rafetseder and colleagues’ (2010; 2013) tasks. In 
particular, these findings raise questions about the nature of the development that takes place—
whether it is primarily in counterfactual reasoning, or related abilities such as causal reasoning, 
pragmatic inferencing, or executive functioning. While the current results indicate that children 
are able to reason about overdetermined events with different causal structures by age 8, future 
work should investigate the range of causal models children can manipulate counterfactually, 
and how this may be related to their domain-specific knowledge and the (ir)relevant causal 
inferences they make.  
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